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Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization 
and Civil Order Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016, 352 pp., hb 
£65.00 
 
 
In this remarkable book, Lindsay Farmer presents a wide-reaching 
account of the emergence of modern criminal law: an account which 
frames both the law and its doctrines, as well as the institutions 
through which criminalization is realized, within the context of its 
developing relationship with the modern state and that state’s 
projects of governance.  On Farmer’s view, criminal law and the 
distinctive modalities of criminalization are oriented to the 
production of a certain form of civil order: and that conception of 
order represents something quite fundamental about the nature of 
modern societies and of how state power is coordinated and 
legitimated.  Farmer will already be well known to criminal lawyers 
and legal historians for his first, fine monograph, Criminal Law, 
Tradition and Legal Order: Crime and the Genius of Scots Law1, and 
also to legal theorists for his role in The Trial on Trial2 and the more 
recent Criminalization3 projects, which have made a powerful 
contribution to criminal law theory over the last decade.  The 
systematic, even definitive nature of his latest monograph makes 
this symposium in a leading legal theory journal most appropriate.   
 
I should preface my contribution by acknowledging that I know 
Farmer and his work well, and have long been an admirer of the 
distinctive blend of historical scholarship and theoretical acuity 
                                                     
1  Cambridge University Press 1996. 
2 Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor Tadros, The Trial on Trial I: Truth 
and Due Process 2004; II: Judgment and Calling to Account 2005; III: Towards a Normative 
Theory of the Criminal Trial 2007: Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
3  Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall, Massimo Renzo and Victor Tadros, The 
Boundaries of the Criminal Law 2010; The Structures of the Criminal Law 2011; The 
Constitution of the Criminal Law 2013; Criminalization: the Political Morality of the Criminal 
Law 2015, Oxford University Press. 
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which characterizes his writing.  After a brief period when we were 
colleagues at Birkbeck in the mid 1990s, we have kept in close touch 
and regularly exchange drafts of each other’s work.   We have both 
been fortunate to have been working in the broad criminal law field 
at a particularly auspicious time: a period in which some innovative 
ideas were being explored, and one in which some of the most 
influential established scholars in the field have been open-minded 
and encouraging to younger scholars working in different traditions.  
A notable example is Andrew Ashworth, whose own work has 
embraced not only criminal law but also sentencing, evidence and 
the criminal process – a far broader terrain than the one over which 
leading doctrinal scholars would have worked 40 years ago.4  
Another is George Fletcher, whose Rethinking Criminal Law5  gave a 
new impetus to historical scholarship when it appeared in the late 
1970s, reviving other scholars’ appreciation of how much was to be 
learnt from looking at the dynamic developments of criminal law 
over time.  And Fletcher’s serious treatment – critical though it was – 
of the interdisciplinary thesis of Jerome Hall’s Theft, Law and Society6  
was a timely reminder of what could be gained by – as well as of the 
pitfalls of –  setting criminal law in a broader historical and socio-
economic context.  From the 1980s on, in many English-speaking 
countries, notably Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States, 
the critical, historical and feminist work of scholars like John 
Braithwaite, Markus Dubber, Jeremy Horder, Mark Kelman, Ngaire 
Naffine, Alan Norrie, Mariana Valverde, Celia Wells and Lucia Zedner 
was creating a vibrant intellectual context for the broader 
approaches to criminal law to which Farmer and I were also drawn.  
Farmer’s book contributes materially to this rich tradition.  
                                                     
4  Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law was first published in 1991 and is now in its 8th 
edition, in the hands of Jeremy Horder (Oxford University Press 2016); The Criminal Process: 
An Evaluative Study went to four editions, the first in 1994, and the last, co-written with 
Mike Redmayne, in 2010 (Oxford University Press); and Sentencing and Criminal Justice,  
first published in 1983 as Sentencing and Penal Policy  (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson),  
is now in its 6th edition (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
5  (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown; 1978) 
6  Second edition (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1952). 
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I had the advantage of receiving the final draft of Making the Modern 
Criminal Law just as I finalized my last book,7 and on the basis of our 
many conversations over the years, I settled down to read it with a 
sense of excitement, and with very high expectations.  These were 
not disappointed.  Indeed I felt as if I were reading the coming to 
fruition of many of Farmer’s ideas over the last twenty years – all 
brought into clear and illuminating relation with one another, in – 
particularly for such a substantial book – a remarkably digestible 
form. The book opens with a methodological chapter which explores 
the main traditions in theoretical criminal law scholarship, and 
makes the case for an institutional approach which is capable of 
integrating the insights of each of these traditions while transcending 
the limitations of each. In particular, Farmer demonstrates the 
pitfalls of the tendency to reduce criminal law theory to a question 
of normative moral theory, hence sidelining its distinctive functions 
and institutional structure – an argument which however is he is 
careful to point out does not imply that criminal law is immune from 
moral evaluation and criticism.8   Farmer’s institutional conception of 
criminal law is situated within both political and social theory, with 
the presence of many of the great figures in each tradition of 
thought about criminalization, the state and social order – Locke, 
Hobbes, Smith, Mill; Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Elias – being felt in his 
elegant account of criminal law’s distinctive modern role in 
underwriting a certain vision of civility and citizenship guaranteed by 
the state.  This vision in turn implies that questions of jurisdiction are 
central; in addition, the impulse to systematize and professionalize 
which is reflected in projects – imagined or realized – of codification, 
in treatises and textbooks and in legal education – is very much part 
of the distinctive quality of modern criminal law.  Responsibility, 
which is central to most criminal law theory, also plays a key part in 
Farmer’s story, though as a broad understanding of attribution which 
                                                     
7 Nicola Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests and Institutions (Oxford 
University Press 2016). 
8 Farmer, Makiing the Modern Criminal Law  op. cit  note 1, p. 33. 
 4 
cannot be understood independent of the quality and rationale of 
criminalization, and which may facilitate the broadening of imposed 
responsibilities as well as constraining them.   
 
The questions which I raise in the remainder of this contribution are 
offered very much in the mode of dialogue about shared interests 
and concerns.  I focus in particular on some of the questions of 
method which have arisen as critical, historical and contextual 
criminal law scholars have expanded the boundaries of conventional 
legal analysis.9 
 
A first such concern has to do with periodization.  For any scholar 
seeking to trace the development of a complex social institution over 
a couple of centuries, periodization is an almost indispensable tool, 
for both analytic and expositional reasons.  Without a sense of 
relatively distinctive stages, it is hard to identify the principal 
explanatory arguments which underpin the overall account.  And 
without periodization to give a structure to the exposition, the 
reader may get lost in a welter of detail.  Of course, periodization is 
not the only tool available here; and Farmer also deploys a range of 
thematic classifications.  Hence he develops his analysis of how 
things worked in each of his broad periods – the 18th Century 
emergence of a new sense of criminal law as concerned with public 
wrong; the era of the 19th century legislative state; that of early 20th 
Century penal welfarism; and that of the neoclassical revival of the 
late 20th Century - in relation to key issues such as codification, 
jurisdiction and responsibility, before turning to three key areas of 
substantive law – that relating to persons, to property and to sex.   
 
At root, Farmer makes a strong case for the modernity of criminal 
law as a form of public law, through its emerging relationship with a 
certain conception of the state and of governance in the late 18th 
                                                     
9  For thoughtful discussion of these methodological issues, and in particular of the place of 
ethics in relation to the historical and critical tradition, see Alan Norrie, ‘Criminal Law and 
Ethics: Beyond Normative Assertion and its Critique’, (2017) Modern Law Review  955-73. 
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Century.  This is very persuasive.  On the other hand, it must be 
acknowledged – as indeed Farmer does10 - that many of the features 
of criminal law which Farmer highlights as symptomatic of this 
emerging modernity in fact have a longer history. For example, the 
very conception of ‘pleas of the crown’, and of the judges as 
enforcing the King’s or Queen’s peace, in some sense already 
discloses a public law and centralising impulse.  So I found myself 
wondering at various points whether this might lend itself to an 
interpretation of this quality of criminal law in terms of a spectrum 
rather than a distinctive moment of reshaping.  Similarly, one might 
argue that the emergence of hybrid offences like the preventive 
orders of recent years11 is a throwback to a less centralised 
understanding of how the proscription of criminal wrongs relates to 
the project of securing civil order, with the conceptualisation of 
wrongs in the neoclassical period harking back in some sense to the 
premodern revenge/private retribution model.  This further suggests 
a possible link with the argument, developed in my last book, that 
the end of the 20th Century has seen a resurgence of character 
responsibility. 12   We could think of this, in the terms of Farmer’s 
method, of a remaking of attributions of responsibility founded on 
character in a new, hybrid form which incorporates elements of risk 
or danger – this emerging practice of attribution itself reflecting a 
shifting conception of the civil order which is to be guaranteed by 
the state.13  This would be another way of interpreting the 
‘neoclassical’ turn to censure, help to establish the link with 
neoliberalism to which Farmer is pointing, in the specific sense of an 
intensified use of criminal law to govern the marginal.  Like any 
complex social institution, criminal law presents a history of uneven 
development, and any systematic presentation inevitably flattens 
out that unevenness.   But the systematic presentation itself raises 
                                                     
10  Farmer op cit note 1, p. 42. 
11 See for example Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice (Oxford University 
Press 2014); Peter Ramsay, The Insecurity State (Oxford University Press 2012). 
12  Lacey op cit note 7, Chapter 5. 
13  In Ramsay’s terms (op cit note 11) this emergent notion of civility consists in the state’s 
providing a guarantee of security in the face of subjects’ ‘vulnerable autonomy’.  
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new issues and provides an invitation to further theorization.  To 
take another example, Farmer’s approach challenges us to reflect on 
how to account for the doubtless significant fact that English criminal 
law only formed itself within a framework of completely unified 
criminal jurisdiction in 1971.14 
 
A second issue is the theoretical question of the extent to which we 
should see the modality of law as itself unitary or distinctive.   On 
Farmer’s view, while law’s modality is most certainly shaped 
historically, and should be understood in terms of the institutional 
arrangements through which it is realized,15 it is nonetheless 
sufficiently distinctive at any particular time to be treated as 
discrete.  Putting one’s finger on the perfectly nuanced 
characterization here is a tricky matter; one with which most 
sociologically, historically or critically minded legal theorists, myself 
included, have grappled.16   This tension is felt in Farmer’s effort to 
acknowledge special aims in particular areas of criminal law while 
insisting on maintaining a conception of criminal law as a whole or ‘in 
general’.17  But it is a tension which is inescapable, and best handled 
through precisely the sort of reflexive theorization which Farmer’s 
book provides. 
 
This question of law’s distinctive modality abuts, of course, upon the 
lively debate about legal pluralism;18 and its converse is the question 
                                                     
14  Farmer op cit  note 1, Chapter 4. 
15  Farmer draws here on Neil MacCormick’s influential institutional conception of law:  
Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford University Press 2007). 
16  See Lacey op cit Chapter 6; William Twining, General Jurisprudence (Cambridge University 
Press 2009); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law (Cambridge University Press 
2017); Roger Cotterell, Sociological Jurisprudence: Juristic thought and social inquiry 
(Routledge, forthcoming 2017).  
17  Farmer op cit note 1, p. 30. 
18  See for example Emannuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: legal theory and the space for 
legal pluralism (Aldershot: Ashgate 2009);  William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory 
(Cambridge University Press 2000); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal 
Common Sense (Cambridge University Press 2002).   
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of the relationship between formal, criminal-legal and informal 
modes of governance and social ordering. Farmer’s thesis about the 
emergence of a modern state project of criminalization in pursuit of 
civil order might be taken to imply that that private vengeance and 
other non-legal forms of dispute resolution diminish in significance in 
the modern period.  And, in some sense, that is true.  Yet such forms 
of plural social ordering do persist, and it is interesting to speculate 
as to whether the perception of the need to keep them in their place 
is one of the things which has shaped the boundaries of 
criminalisation at various points in modern history.  Brian Simpson’s 
unforgettable Cannibalism and the Common Law 19 explores one 
such case study.  On Simpson’s reading, the prosecution of (two of) 
the shipwrecked sailors in R v Dudley and Stephens20 represented a 
concerted attempt by the senior judiciary to assert the authority of 
the criminal law over and above the maritime conventions which had 
governed social reactions to cannibalism following shipwreck over 
the centuries, and which were regularly reported in the national 
press in the decades immediately preceding the case. That this 
assertion was still needing to be made in the late 19th Century seems 
highly significant.   
 
A third question relates to the place of punishment – both penal 
institutions and conceptions of what motivates and justifies penal 
measures – within a systematic conception of criminal law.  Farmer 
argues persuasively at the very outset of his book that, both 
conceptually and practically, the aims, functions and social meaning 
of criminal law should not be assumed to be driven by, and cannot 
be reduced to, the imperatives of penality: criminal law has a 
symbolic function as well as setting social and collective standards 
and, at least indirectly, constituting a certain conception of 
citizenship21 – all roles distinct from the functions of penality.22   
                                                     
19  A.W. Brian Simpson, Cannibalism and the Common Law (Chicago University Press 1984) 
20  (1884) 14 QBD 273. 
21 Farmer op. cit. 116-7. 
22 Farmer op cit pp. 14-22. 
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Farmer argues persuasively that much – particularly liberal – criminal 
law theory has had the penal tail wagging the criminalization dog, 
and has accordingly misrepresented or downplayed important 
aspects of criminal law and its distinctive aims and functions. Yet 
punishment turns out to be very hard to keep in its place.  So while 
Farmer’s characterization of the 18th and 19th Centuries are framed 
in terms of, first, a distinctive conception of what the criminal law 
represents and stands for and against; and then an emerging 
conception of state governance through the distinctive modality of 
legislation; his 20th Century classifications – penal welfarism and the 
neo-classical revival with its conception of criminal responsibility in 
terms of ‘the ‘punishable subject’ – suggests that punishment and its 
various aims, functions and modalities has nonetheless played a 
substantial role in shaping the overall history that he recounts. 
 
 
This leads us to a further point about the centrality which Farmer 
gives to the aims, functions or purposes of criminalisation - as 
distinct from those of punishment - in his account of criminal law.  
Clearly, they need to be a key part of any complete picture of the 
nature of criminal law as a social institution. The law’s treatment of 
the ignorance or mistake of fact/ ignorance or mistake of law 
distinction is one really useful example of how law’s criminalisation 
functions and role directly shape its understandings of responsibility.  
These and other linkages come out nicely in Farmer’s account. But 
there are two complications which need to be acknowledged.  The 
first is the obvious fact that, within its umbrella role of underwriting 
civil order, criminalisation may have more than one purpose; indeed 
its purposes may be somewhat different from its actual roles or 
functions, which may moreover come into tension with one 
another.  The second is that ‘aim’ or ‘purpose’ assumes an agent – 
again, there may be more than one relevant agent or group or 
institution, and in addition we may be ‘reading purpose off’ 
institutional structures or vectors of power which reflect the 
accumulated impact of the actions of a range of agents over time.  
 9 
This is broadly what I was trying to capture with the structure of In 
Search of Criminal Responsibility.23 This distinguished between the 
interests and structures of power which shape the development of 
criminal law; the institutions through which those developments are 
realized, and which also shape and constrain them; and the ideas 
which propel, rationalize and indeed limit criminal law, while 
emphasizing their co-evolution and inter-relationship.  But it must be 
admitted that it can be tricky not to give way to the temptation to 
write/think as if the criminal law were the outcome of one coherent 
project.   Farmer’s welcome emphasis on the insight that law is 
‘made’ – and indeed is constantly being remade – provides a 
nuanced way of presenting the multiple nature of criminal law’s roles 
amid its process of uneven development over time. 
 
  
 
In short, this book is a huge contribution.  Full of insight; bold; 
erudite, it is a book which really moves the field on.  The central idea 
of civil order/security which Farmer has developed, and the way in 
which he draws, explains and illustrates its connection with the 
development of modern states, significantly advances our 
understanding of criminal law’s place in the political and social 
development of modern societies. The focus on jurisdiction; the 
contextualization of the development of criminal law in political 
history, and in particular within the history of colonialism and its long 
term ramifications; the interpretation of criminal law as public law; 
the elaboration of a conception of civil as distinct from public order; 
the elucidation of the relevance of the imperial project to criminal 
law; and the historical treatment of areas of substantive law, notably 
the sexual offences, all strike me as particularly valuable and 
distinctive contributions. But, above all, Farmer has shown us that it 
is possible to combine a meticulous historical scholarship with a big 
analytic picture of what criminal law and its institutional structures 
are all about, and of what shapes their development over time.   His 
                                                     
23  Op cit note 7. 
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book sets the standard to which we should all aspire.   
 
 
Nicola Lacey, School Professor of Law, Gender and Social Policy, 
London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE. 
